国际危机组织-走向南苏丹的美好未来（英文）-2021.2-37页.pdf

Headquarters International Crisis Group Avenue Louise 235 1050 Brussels,Belgium Tel:+32 2 502 90 38 brusselscrisisgroup.org Preventing War.Shaping Peace.Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan Africa Report N300|10 February 2021 Table of Contents Executive Summary.i I.Introduction.1II.Tortured History,Troubled Present.3A.Decades of Cleavages.5B.Pre-independence Inclusion,Post-independence Exclusion.7C.A Shaky Peace.8D.Shattered Country,Shattered Plans.9III.Fighting Fires.11A.Preventing Another Collapse.11B.Silencing the Other Guns.12IV.Elections:Hurdle,Not Finish Line.15A.Risks Inherent in an Election.15B.Averting the Loser-Loses-All Scenario.17V.The Long Term:Beyond Kiir and Machar.19A.Sharing the Centre.20B.Decentralising the State.22C.From Here to There:An Unclear Road Ahead.24VI.Conclusion.26APPENDICES A.Map of Conflict Risks in South Sudan.27 B.About the International Crisis Group.28 C.Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2018.29 D.Crisis Group Board of Trustees.31 Principal Findings Whats new?In February 2020,South Sudans two main belligerents began forming a unity government pursuant to a peace deal inked a year and a half earlier.But the pact is fragile,smaller conflicts are still ablaze and the threat of return to full-blown civil war remains.Why does it matter?Forthcoming elections could test the peace deal severe-ly.Looking further ahead,conflict will continue to plague South Sudan until its leaders forge a political system that distributes power more widely.The cost of cyclical fighting since 2013 has been steep:hundreds of thousands dead and millions uprooted from their homes.What should be done?South Sudans leaders should strengthen pre-elec-tion power sharing and broaden the peace deal to include other parties.They should not rush to polls,if conflict looms,and seek a political settlement decen-tralising governance and cementing national power sharing.Civil society and external partners should continually advocate for these steps.International Crisis Group Africa Report N300 10 February 2021 Executive Summary Fted at birth a decade ago,South Sudan is failing.It suffered a brutal civil war from 2013 to 2018,exposing a country whose foundations were weaker and divisions deeper than its well-wishers envisioned.The war has quietened thanks to a peace deal,signed in 2018 by the two main belligerents.But the path to stability is unclear.Not only could the pact collapse,but it does little to calm an insurgency in the na-tions south or local violence elsewhere.Elections looming as soon as 2022 threaten to inflame tensions between its signatories.Moreover,South Sudans winner-take-all political system ill suits a country that requires consensus among major blocs to avert cyclical power struggles.South Sudanese need to get through elections,which may well require some form of pre-election power-sharing pact.They also need a re-vised political settlement.While prospects of that for now appear slim,the countrys reform-minded elites,civil society and external partners should still work toward fairer power sharing at the centre and greater devolution.While the countrys stark development needs were apparent at independence,South Sudanese and outsiders significantly downplayed its political woes,especially its ethnic cleavages.That proved a mistake.Just two years after the triumphal in-auguration of the worlds newest country in July 2011,South Sudan collapsed at the centre,as the rival camps loyal to President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar turned against each other in bloody combat that shattered the ruling party.The resultant fighting,which has mostly taken place along ethnic lines,has killed as many as 400,000 people.Since the 2018 peace deal,which moved forward in Febru-ary 2020 when Kiir and Machar agreed to form a unity government,the ceasefire be-tween the two main warring parties has held but the pact has accomplished little else.With the country so broken,the first challenge is maintaining and expanding upon the ceasefire.The peace process requires endless maintenance by external actors,notably East African leaders,with their attentions consumed by efforts to prevent a slide back to war between the two chief factions.Meanwhile,groups that fought un-der Machars banner could well split off and return to conflict.Communal violence in parts of the country is running up the death count,particularly in remote rural areas.An insurgency led by Thomas Cirillo,a veteran general in the Souths previous struggle against Khartoum,has also taken root in the southern Equatoria region,including near the capital Juba,and risks spreading.Regional and other diplomacy aimed at bolstering the ceasefire between Kiir and Machar is critical,but those in-volved should do what they can to prevent splinter conflicts and broaden the peace process to include Cirillo.The next hurdle is preventing renewed violence in the run-up to or aftermath of promised elections.The polls are expected to pit Kiirs coalition against Machars in what some call a final showdown.That the peace deal culminates in such a winner-take-all contest is a potentially fatal flaw.Even if fighting does not erupt before the polls,as occurred in 2013 when Kiirs faction exchanged fire with Machars,setting off the civil war,an all-or-nothing vote risks dissolving the agreements political set-tlement by locking the losers out of power.Regional leaders and other external actors have to tread a fine line:pushing South Sudanese parties toward elections while Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan Crisis Group Africa Report N300,5 February 2021 Page ii showing flexibility when necessary to create space for them to reach consensus on key decisions.At the same time,they should keep a watchful eye on pre-election dynamics and encourage dialogue between Kiir and Machar.If the poll looks set to be fraught,particularly if,as appears likely,both men decide to run,regional leaders should push for a pre-election deal that guarantees a share of power to the loser.Getting past the vote without a descent into further violence will be hard enough,but the bigger challenge lies in finding a settlement among South Sudanese that lays the groundwork for a sustainable peace.Regional leaders and diplomats are short of ideas as to how to steer South Sudan out of its pattern of peace deals that fall apart.They privately express little optimism or vision for South Sudans future.Nor is such a vision to be found among South Sudans major donors,which also once championed its cause and now foot the huge humanitarian bills,if not the ultimate costs,for its failings.Solutions could be found in the reshaping of South Sudans political architecture toward more consensual forms of governance.Constitutionally,the country is a ma-joritarian democracy.Yet in practice,peace in South Sudan requires consensus among elites and communities,which often mobilise as well-armed ethno-political blocs,notably within Kiirs Dinka people,the nations largest,Machars Nuer,the next largest,and Equatorians,a diffuse grouping of ethnicities in the nations south.Even the concept of a centralised state in South Sudan butts against the reality of a country lacking basic institutions and infrastructure including roads.Maintaining stability is impossible without broad accommodation.A more durable political settlement requires reducing the winner-take-all stakes.Options could include institutionalised power sharing at the centre or an elite bargain to rotate power among key ethno-political groups or regions.Some form of decen-tralisation is almost certainly necessary.Such remedies cannot cure all the countrys ills,but they might provide its elites a sense of shared interest that has eluded them over decades of brutal conflict.Prospects for such reform for now appear slim,with powerful elites,including Kiir and Machar themselves,for the most part opposed.Still,until space opens for official dialogue on reform,South Sudanese civil forces should advance discussions in whatever venue they can,including outside the state arena.South Sudans external partners should be ready to facilitate such dialogue,if asked.Long-term peace in South Sudan almost certainly requires the countrys leaders to agree on a more equitable division of power and resources,no matter how long it takes them to do so.Juba/Nairobi/Brussels,10 February 2021 International Crisis Group Africa Report N300 10 February 2021 Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan I.Introduction Peer deep,then deeper,and the number of South Sudans problems only appears to grow.Years of civil war have devastated the country,leaving up to 400,000 people dead and displacing four million one in every three South Sudanese either inside the country or across its borders.1 South Sudan requires massive food aid to prevent chronic famine.2 Its politicians have plundered oil revenue that many hoped would pay for a brighter future.3 The country lacks the most basic infrastructure.Despite a 2018 peace deal,including a ceasefire between the main belligerents that has largely held,violence blights large swathes of the country,with ruling elites never far from turning against each other and going back to war.South Sudan is thus often absorbed in trying to keep its head above water.Its for-eign partners,fatigued by conflict and aid bills,must apply recurrent pressure on parties to stop fighting or to stick to a peace deal.National elections loom as early as 2022,worrying officials and diplomats who wonder if the country will be ready,that is,if the unity government that brought President Salva Kiir and his arch-rival Riek Machar together in 2020 has not imploded by then due to disputes between them,including over the poll itself.Amid the constant efforts to halt violence,ward off 1 Crisis Group Statement,“A Major Step Toward Ending South Sudans Civil War”,25 February 2020.Crisis Group has covered the Sudanese and,subsequently,South Sudanese conflicts in depth since 2002.See,inter alia,Crisis Group Africa Briefing N147,Dj Vu:Preventing Another Col-lapse in South Sudan,4 November 2019;and Crisis Group Africa Reports Ns 270,Salvaging South Sudans Fragile Peace Deal,13 March 2019;217,South Sudan:A Civil War by Any Other Name,10 April 2014;172,Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan,4 April 2011;106,Sudans Com-prehensive Peace Agreement:The Long Road Ahead,31 March 2006;and 96,The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement:Sudans Uncertain Peace,25 July 2005.For various population estimates,see“South Sudan”,Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook,last updated 1 February 2021;“South Sudan”,World Health Organisation(WHO),n.d.;and“South Sudan”,UN Data,n.d.2 The World Food Programme(WFP)estimates that 60 per cent of South Sudanese struggle to feed themselves.WFP requires roughly$1 billion per year to reach nearly half of the population with food assistance.See“South Sudan Emergency”and“South Sudan Emergency Dashboard October 2020”,WFP,November 2020.See also Crisis Group Africa Briefing N124,South Sudan:Instru-ments of Pain(II):Conflict and Famine in South Sudan,26 April 2017.3 South Sudanese politicians acknowledge that theft of state oil revenues has been widespread since 2005.Crisis Group interviews,2018-2020;and Crisis Group analysts interviews in a previous ca-pacity,2016-2018.South Sudan ranked 179th of 180 countries listed in Transparency Internation-als 2019 Corruption Perception Index.President Salva Kiir admitted in 2012 that“an estimated$4 billion are unaccounted for or,simply put,stolen by current and former officials,as well as corrupt individuals with close ties to government officials.Most of these funds have been taken out of the country and deposited in foreign bank accounts”.Letters Kiir sent to dozens of current and former officials demanding funds be returned,12 May 2012,signed template on file with Crisis Group.For two major investigations of distinct billion-dollar corruption scandals,see Simona Foltyn,“How South Sudans elite looted its foreign reserves”,Mail&Guardian,3 November 2017;Mark Ander-son and Michael Gibb,“As South Sudan Seeks Funds for Peace,a Billion-Dollar Spending Spree”,Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project,December 2019.Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan Crisis Group Africa Report N300,10 February 2021 Page 2 starvation,keep the stuttering peace deal on track and push the country toward a vote,outside powers as well as many South Sudanese seem to have lost sight of any vision for longer-term stability in South Sudan.A strategy for escaping the current quagmire must go beyond conflict mitigation to address South Sudans failed political model,which concentrates authority in the centre and unleashes a king-of-the-hill power scramble.The winner-take-all govern-ance system fuels constant tensions among elites,already sore from decades of bloody infighting,leaving the country vulnerable to relapse into war.Many community,rebel and religious leaders,government officials and womens groups across the country express not only deep frustration with the national leadership but also the belief that the solution lies in greater autonomy and representation for South Sudans diverse communities and regions.They echo tenets of the liberation movement that preceded the countrys 2011 secession from Sudan:decentralisation,enshrined in the first constitution,and the promise that South Sudanese would share the country as equals.4 Shared and devolved power might be a credible path out of crisis,albeit one strewn with obstacles notably,elites who often conduct themselves more as war entrepreneurs than statesmen.This report proposes strategies for addressing South Sudans immediate problems and then takes a longer view,charting options for the country to escape its perennial cycles of conflict.Research involved dozens of interviews across South Sudan,in Horn of Africa capitals and in New York,Washington,Brussels and London,as well as by remote means.4 Crisis Group interviews and Crisis Group analysts interviews in a previous capacity,Juba,Wau,Malakal,Yambio,Ezo,Yei,Aweil,Rumbek,Yirol,Raja,Kodok,Tonga,Ganyiel,Kapoeta,and refugee camps in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo,2016-2020.Toward a Viable Future for South Sudan Crisis Group Africa Report N300,10 February 2021 Page 3 II.Tortured History,Troubled Present On 9 July 2011,thousands of South Sudanese thronged the capital of what would soon be Africas 54th state to celebrate their independence and what many hoped would be the capstone of a five-decade struggle for liberation from successive repres-sive governments in Khartoum.South Sudanese had voted by a landslide in a refer-endum six months earlier to carve out a new state from Sudan following protracted talks between South Sudanese leaders and representatives of Omar al-Bashirs Khar-toum administration.Despite the joy on display at the independence celebrations,few thought the road ahead would be easy or smooth.South Sudan at its outset was a place of abject under-d