第25卷第1期2023年1月科技与管理Science-TechnologyandManagementVol.25No.1Jan.,2023文章编号:1008-7133(2023)01-0077-12买方风险下考虑创新信号传递的供应链贸易信贷决策研究朱雪春,杨思琳(江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013)摘要:针对买方风险下创新信号传递如何影响供应链贸易信贷决策这一问题,建立创新水平信号传递博弈模型,分析质押担保资金、伪装水平、贸易信贷利率等对贸易信贷决策的影响。研究发现:分离均衡下,当买方传递高创新水平信号时,最佳策略是信贷;传递低创新水平信号时,只有当质押担保资金超过临界值时,信贷才是最佳策略;为使买方不偏离均衡,供应商需调整对两种买方企业的信贷利率。混同均衡下,质押担保资金较小时,创新能力强的买方市场占比大于临界值时,供应商才对其提供信贷;不信贷时,创新能力弱的买方会偏离均衡路径,对此供应商应合理收取信贷利率。本研究不仅可丰富买方风险和创新信号传递研究,也为供应链贸易信贷提供决策参考。关键词:创新信号;贸易信贷;买方风险;信号博弈;供应链DOI:10.16315/j.stm.2023.01.007中图分类号:F273文献标志码:AResearchonsupplychaintradecreditdecisionconsideringinnovationsignaltransmissionunderbuyerriskZHUXue-chun,YANGSi-lin(SchoolofManagement,JiangsuUniversity,Zhenjiang212013,China)Abstract:Thepaperfocusesonthecentralissueofhowinnovationsignaltransmissionaffectssupplychaintradecreditdecisionsunderbuyerrisk,thenestablishesagamemodelbasedoninnovationsignaltransmission.Theeffectsofthepledgeguaranteefunds,camouflagelevelandtradecreditinterestrateonthetradecreditdecisionisanalyzed.Theresultsshowasfollows.Undertheseparationequilibrium,whenthebuyersendsahighinnovationsignal,thesupplier'sbeststrategyistradecredit.Whenthebuyersendslowinnovationsignal,tradecreditisthebeststrategyonlywhenthepledgeguaranteefundexceedsthecriticalvalue;Inordertokeepthebuyerawayfromtheequilibrium,thesupplierneedstoadjustthecreditinterestrateofthetwobuyerenterprises.Underconfusionequilibrium,whenpledgeguaranteefundissmallandtheproportionofbuyer'smarketwithstronginnovationabilityisgreaterthanthecriticalvalue,supplierwillconducttradecreditwithit;Inthecaseofnotradecredit,thebuyerwit...